Source Notes

Prologue – Trigon (Section Notes)

The case of Alexander Ogorodnik is one of the most intriguing and celebrated cases of the Cold War, and in Russia has achieved iconic status as both a triumph of KGB Counterintelligence, and a tragedy in which CIA perfidy in the form of poison supplied to Ogorodnik ultimately thwarted the ability of the state to achieve full justice.   For the descriptions or Marti Peterson, I have relied on her memoir The Widow Spy (Red Canary Press, 2012) and numerous personal interviews during the course of writing Year of the Spy. Other than Marti’s parts, the remainder of this section is derived from published Russian language books and documentary interviews, of which there are many:


  • E. Kevorkov, General Boyarov. Moscow, 2003, Russian Language. This is the definitive authorized biography of Major General Vitaly Boyarov. It is not available in English. Copies can be obtained from Russia as of July 31, 2013 by calling (095) 291-51-44 and 290-04-38.
  • The Documentary Film Trianon: Encryption From the Dead, 2012, Pygmalion Productions, Russian Language, written by Sergey Vetlin and directed by Mikhail Available online at <>.
  • Alexander Shinstein, Interview With Vitaly Boyarov, Russian Language , Available online: Accessed July 15, 2013. <>
  • Although E. Kevorkov, General Boyarov, is not available online, an extended excerpt is available at <>.
  • Igor Peretrukhin, The Agent Named Trianon, 2000, Russian Language, Tsentrpoligraf. Available for purchase online as of July 30, 2013 at < 11055/>
  • Martha Peterson, The Widow Spy, 2012, Red Canary


The Evil Empire

Ronald Reagan’s Evil Empire speech was one of the pivotal moments in the Cold War, and in that spring of 1983 as I was preparing to go to Moscow, it created a charged atmosphere of tension and purpose. At the time the words seemed unnecessarily inflammatory and in spite of the fact that in SE Division I was surrounded by dedicated Cold Warriors, it would have been difficult to find anyone who fully endorsed the rhetoric. The general perception in the halls of SE Division that while it might be truth-telling, it was not helpful to the difficult mission that we were charged to undertake in Moscow.  History would prove that there was more than bluster involved. Much has been written about how it came into being. A good account is Frank Warner’s “The Evil Empire Speech: The Full Story of Ronald Reagan’s Historic Address” which can be accessed online as of 2016 at:   I also relied on G. Thomas Goodnight’s “Ronald Reagan’s Re-Formulation of the Rhetoric of War: Analysis of the “Zero Option,” “Evil Empire,” and “Star Wars” Speeches, accessible at




Except where otherwise noted, the factual disclosures in this chapter are based on Edward Lee Howard with Richard Cole, Safe House: The Compelling Story of the Only CIA Operative to Seek Asylum in Russia (Bethesda, MD: National Press Books, 1995. A word of caution — Howard’s book is self-serving, and certain assertions made in the book have been proved to be inaccurate. His description of his exit from the CIA appears reasonably credible, however, and is presented here with the caveat that the reader should exercise caution and be aware that Howard is not a 100% reliable source. The quote at the end of the chapter is from an interview of a former SE Division officer who was part of senior SE Division management at the time, and who did not want to be quoted by name.


The firing of Howard with little or no apparent thought given to the potential for mayhem that he could cause is both a baffling failure of imagination by the CIA, and at the same time is a testament to just how unthinkable it was at the time to contemplate a CIA officer committing treason.



One of the largest struggles I had in arriving at a format for Year of the Spy was how to incorporate my own experiences into the narrative while still keeping the telling of the story as a journalistic exercise rather than a memoir. It was only quite late in the game that I decided that the only way to achieve this was to convert my portions in to third person narrative, which is an unnatural process but one which created an enforced discipline. Once my sections were in the same format as the rest – it was easier to see how to balance it with the others. I’m sure that in the final analysis, there is still a slight emphasis on my personal role, simply because of the greater access I have had to the mental state of this character.   But it is my hope, and intent, that Sellers should emerge as one of the half dozen main threads of the story; no more, no less.  Having said that, everything from this chapter is from personal experience.


I sat in a cubicle with Howard for two months prior to his getting fired, and never suspected anything about his drinking problems, his drug problems, or his petty theft issues. Later, when we would learn that he had become a clandestine agent for the KGB, I would be thunderously floored to think I’d not had an inkling—and from that day forward I have always been exceptionally mindful of the capacity for deception. To this day it remains a deeply bewildering and sobering experience. That said, I doubt that Howard had any idea of cooperating with the Soviets at the point at which I knew him. I think it is clear that his abrupt firing by CIA is what set him off. The most difficult part of this to fathom is how the senior management of SE Division and CIA office of personnel seem to have dealt with his firing as an administrative matter only, without major thought given to the secrets he had been privy to while prepping to go to Moscow.   I am inclined to ascribe much of what happened in 1985 to the ‘fortunes of war’ – (for example, I don’t see how CIA could have anticipated or interdicted wither Ames or Hanssen) – but Howard’s summary termination was a cataclysmic failure of imagination.



There were thirty-one or thirty-two volumes of the Tolkachev case, each several inches thick, and I read every word multiple times. It is difficult to describe the degree to which these were perceived to be in essence the “sacred scrolls” of SE Division. Tolkachev was, we were repeatedly told, the single most important asset to ever work on behalf of CIA. His information on Soviet air defense capabilities was, we were told, so valuable that it paid for the entire budget of CIA many times over by virtue of the savings achieved in countermeasures as a result of his information. For this chapter I relied to some degree on memory, but also on a close reading of Barry Royden, A Worth Successor to Penkovsky, CIA Studies in Intelligence, accessible online at: I wrote this section before David Hoffman’s The Billion Dollar Spy (Doubleday, 2015) had been published. I recommend David’s book as an excellent and thorough account of this case.


The description of Gus Hathaway and his pistol-waving defense of the CIA enclosure during an embassy fire is from the Russian language book: Igor Atamanenko, Traitors: Army Without Banners, Accessed online on June 15, 2013,

<>and Anatoliy Elizarov, Counterintelligence: the FSB against the world’s leading intelligence The Hathaway story was well known in SE Division at the time as well, and was a big part of the myth that grew up around Gus, who was one of the larger than life figures of the day.


Howard and Ames

Howard’s Safe House is the key source for Howard’s perceptions. I also had lengthy interviews with the CIA’s Jack Platt on this period of Howard’s story. The description of Howard’s initial letter as received by the KGB is from Victor Cherashin Spy Handler: Memoir of the KGB Officer Who Recruited Aldrich Ames and Richard Hanssen (Basic Books, 2008), which is one of the best English language accounts of a major Soviet player in the events of 1985. Cherkashin was the Deputy Rezident and Line KR (Counterintelligence) Chief at the Soviet Embassy in Washington as the events of 1985 unfolded.


For Aldrich Ames, the key reference is Peter Early, Confessions of a Spy: The Real Story of Aldrich Ames (Puttnam, 1997).   Early was able to interview Aldrich Ames in prison.   As with Howard, it can be presumed that there is a certain degree of self-serving manipulation in Ames’ rendering of his story, and it should be read with the understanding that while I have accurately rendered what Ames said, he can at a minimum be presumed to be shading his descriptions in a manner that attempts to mitigate his decisions.


The portions of the chapter that describe what CIA knew and didn’t know about Ames are drawn largely from Sandra Grimes and Jean Vertefouille, Circle of Treason: A CIA Account of Traitor Aldrich Ames and the Men he Betrayed (Naval Academy Press, 2012). Sandy and Jean were two of the key players in the molehunt that would eventually lead to Ames’s arrest, and their account is the definitive one of CIA Headquarters and Aldrich Ames. I also correlated Circle of Treason and Confessions of a Spy with Milt Bearden and James Risen’s The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown With the KGB (Random House, 2002), which includes additional details.




Whereas on the CIA side of this, I have had the ability to interview more than a dozen of the key players, my efforts to capture the Soviet side of the story have been mainly through an exhaustive “scholarly” effort to read every Russian language book, article, and filmed interview of those who were involved with it. This is not for lack of wanting to have direct interviews. Interestingly, in 2016 the old warriors who are my counterparts are still uncomfortable being interviewed by their ex protivnik. I am still trying to break through, and I suspect that a trip to Moscow may be at least part of the solution. In the meantime there is no shortage of Russian language articles, books, and interviews written by the key players in the KGB Second Chief Directorate.   Virtually none of these have been translated into English and so I do think that they are “new” and thus “news” to Western audiences. One who has written extensively and been interviewed in more than 20 documentaries is Vladimir Zaitsev, who has emerged as what I would term as the main living “go-to” interviewee regaring the events of 1985-86.


Zaitsev’s account of the hijacking in Tbilisi caught my attention because, first of all, it is a compelling story in its own right. It also provides a powerful introduction to Group Alpha and I think seeing Zaitsev and Demdidkina and others operating in this situation provides an important framework or foundation for seeing their subsequent actions in Moscow. This particular chapter is based on Vladimir Zaitsev, ‘Crowned by Death” in Spetznaz Rossee, May 2013, June 2013, accessed <>; also a special Archive of the Ministry of Interior of Georgia accessed March 28, 2016 at <>



This chapter begins with a brief recitation of the background and accomplishments of my two fellow Moscow case officers – Paul Stombaugh and Gene Coyle. One of the happiest aspects of the experience of researching and writing Year of the Spy has been the opportunity to reconnect with these two as well as Bill Norville, our deputy. Aside from the parts that are either about them or where they are quoted, they have read and commented on the entire manuscript and although I must take responsibility for what is here, particularly any shortcomings or mistakes, they have contributed mightily to the process. Eventually the book has become a process very similar to the way we would undertake a complicated and delicate piece of communication with Headquarters when we were in Moscow. In those days, Murat and Bill Norville would lead us as we discussed it from all angles, and then someone – usually yours truly—would be designated to draft the message, which would then be circulated and refined until it would go out to Headquarters. As much as possible, I have tried to follow that same process in arriving at the manuscript for Year of the Spy.


Although this is an area that I personally experienced, for the details of the approach by Vorontsov I have been guided primarily by Russian publications, notably Igor Atamenenko, Traitors, Army Without Banners, Chapter “Mr. Incognito” and Rem Krassilnikov, New Crusaders: The CIA and Perestroika,


On the Moscow Stage

Personal experience.


Howard and Ames II

The discussion of how the KGB pursued recontact with Howard is from Victor Cherkashin, Spy Handler. The discussion of CIA’s handling of Howard and Ed’s erratic behavior comes from interviews with several of those who were senior SE division officers during this period; also Bearden/Risen, The Main Enemy, and David Wise, The Spy Who Got Away (Random House 1988) which was the first journalistic attempt to tackle the Ed Howard story.


The Soviet perspective on Howard’s meeting in Vienna with Batamirov draws on A Sladkova, Special Report: The Fate of Counterintelligence (Vesti.Ru) accessed in March 2016 at


The section on Ames draws on Early’s Confessions of Spy, Bearden/Risen’s The Main Enemy, and Tim Weiner, “Why I Spied; Aldrich Ames” (New York Times, Accessed March 2016 at <>



Rem Krassilnikov

Rem Krassilnikov is one of the great figures of the Cold War. He was responsible for KGB counterintelligence operations against the U.S. in Moscow from 1979 until the collapse of the Soviet Union. He died in 2003 but left behind a substantial trail of thought in a number of books, all of which have been thoroughly considered in crafting Year of the Spy. Prominent among his books are Rem Krassilnikov, Ghosts of Tchaikovsky Street, (Geya Publishing, Moscow, 1996) and Rem Krassilnikov, New Crusaders – The CIA and Restructuring, Geya Publishing, Moscow, 2002.


54 Viktor Cherkashin, Spy Handler, Chapter 3.


The Ghost Crusaders

The description of the US Embassy is largely from personal experience, although I was aided also by the description in Robert Ober, Tchaikovsky 19: A Diplomatic Life Behind the Iron Curtain (XLibris, 2009). The quote concerning “the gentlemanly, likable American” is from Rem Krassilnikov, New Crusaders – The CIA and Restructuring, Geya Publishing,


60 Rem Krassilnikov, The Ghosts of Tchaikovsky Street, Chapter “The Operation on Kaluzhskoye Highway”. (regarding GTTAW)



The First Dry Run

This chapter relies mainly on personal experience reconfirmed through interviews of Norville, Coyle, and Stombaugh. The “take” from the Tolkachev meeting in October 1984 is confirmed by Royden, Tolkachev: A Worthy Successor. Anthony Mendez in his book Master of Disguise: Coyle’s quote is from private interviews for Year of the Spy. The description of disguise technique is from Anthony Mendez with Malcom McConnell, Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA (William Morrow, 1999).


Rocket Science

The description of Murat Nakhimov is from personal experience. The discussion of Ooda Loop is from personal experience in my interactions with Murat, buttresse by Frans Osinga, Science Strategy and War, the Strategic Theory of John Boyd, (Abingdon, UK: Routledge) and John R. Boyd, Destruction and Creation, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (September 3, 1976).


The handling of the volunteer approach described in this chapter is one of the significant issues which Year of the Spy attempts to clarify and shed new light on. There is a great deal of inaccurate information circulating about this approach and the situation that ensued. Norville, Coyle, and especially Stombaugh were consulted in much depth and detail about this event, and the version put forward here and in ensuring chapters concerning the approach, the interactions with Daniloff, and later interactions with “Father Potemkin” have all been thoroughly explored by all of the main players in Moscow at the time.




The details of Yeagley’s take from Vanquish in January 1985 are from Royden, Worth Successor to Penkovsky.   This meeting is of particular interest to counterintelligence scholars because it was the last meeting with Vanquish. As noted in the text, KGB authors have put forward the thesis that in the “KGB kitchen” had prepared disinformation which was passed through an unwitting Tolkachev between the fall of 1984 and late May 1985 when he was eventually arrested. An example of this is Читать “Бизнес-разведка” – Доронин Александр, page 88:  In it Doronin reports that for 10 months from the time Ed Howard first reported to the KGB in Vienna in September 1984, until Tolkachev’s arrest in June 1985, the KGB fed disinformation to the CIA through an unaware Tolkachev.   This to me sounds like KGB “hall chatter” rather than real, substantiated information, for several reasons. First, there were only two meetings with Tolkachev after Howard’s meeting in Vienna and the first took place so close to that meeting that it’s logically inconceivable that the KGB could have progressed to the point of passing disinformation through Tolkachev in time for that meeting in October. The information that Tolkachev passed, in fact, was in all probability photographed weeks before the meeting – or in other words, before Ed Howard gave the first incomplete information that would allow the KGB to effectively target Tolkachev as the “Fazotron leak.”


The next meeting was January 1985. The information passed in this meeting was photographed in December 1984. Thus it would have been necessary between late September and December for the KGB to take the incomplete Howard information, identify Tolkachev, develop highly technical disinformation Stealth Bomber info that was sufficiently compelling to fool the top engineer working on the project, contrive to pass that to the engineer, have that information be accepted by the engineer, and then have him report it to the Americans.   And then, the kicker is – having done all of that – then have the phtography be so bad that the Americans couldn’t read the information anyway.   Thus while I’m not inclined to simply dismiss post Cold War accounts by KGB officers, it is very difficult to swallow this one, and so I simply report it here, in the notes, and leave it for others to investigate. I do not find it credible.

The larger question, and the more legitimate one, is whether or not Tolkachev could have been “controlled” at this point, meaning he was appearing to work with CIA while in fact he was working on behalf of KGB in a witting capacity. Under this theory, the botched photography would have been a ploy to make it appear that Tolkachev was still co-operating, when in fact he had already been compromised.   Against this theory are the handwritten notes which he passed, which were extensive and were given high marks by the analysts at the time, so it seems unlikely, plus the KGB documentation of his arrest clearly shows the arrest taking place in at least late spring, based on the weather and visible leaf growth on trees caught by the camera.

In sum, as in most cases, the simplest explanation is the most plausible one, and that explanation is that the KGB First Chief Directorate got a significant lead in late Setpember and passed this lead to Krassilnikov within a few days of obtaining it. This lead allowed Krassilnikov to zero in on Fazotron workers who lived in the apartments on Plochade Vostanniya – of which there could have only been a few. A period of surveillance would have followed, but as we shall see in later chapters, it took until the spring for the investigation to unfold to the point where a clandestine entry of Tolkachev’s apartment was accomplished. As had been the case years before with Ogorodnik, that entry provided the physical evidence that was needed to make it possible for the KGB to arrest.


Stombaugh and Potemkin

Personal experience and author interviews and correspondence with Paul Stombaugh, Bill Norville, and Gene Coyle. Also Nick Daniloff, Two Lives, One Russia, Houghton Mifflin 1988. Because this eventually became a source of compromise and controversy, an extra level of attention was given to making absolutely certain that everything in the account was reviewed by the Moscow CIA team and in particular by Stombaugh, who has the most vivid recollection since it was his operation.


Sellers and Cowl

Personal experience.


Closing in on Tolkachev

Fifty people were living on that floor, and every one of them, during invasion into Tolkachev’s apartment, could leave their apartment and they knew their neighbor… Entering


Ames Crosses Over

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case, Congressional Documents (1 November 1994) accessed online March 2016 at <>; Early/Confessions of a Spy ; Cherkashin/Feiffer, Spy Handler. Note that in Ames’ account, the letter referred to Androsov by his KGB Pseudonym “Kronin” — something which if true would have established that the author of the letter was in fact a CIA officer as he claimed. Cherkashin makes no mention of this. It is possible that this omission is simply a matter of Cherkashin not wishing to disclose Androsov’s pseudonym, and it is also possible that Cherkashin, in his account, intentionally withholds disclosure of Ames’ mention of three double agents. Clearly, the fact that he chose to pay the $50,000 and meet Ames would suggest that there was more to Ames’ letter than Cherkashin acknowledges.


The Arrest of Tolkachev

Vladimir Zaitsev’s role is detailed in Anna Shirev, Hunting For Spies, Russian Special Forces No.3 (March 2011) ( >

The arrest of Tolkachev is examined in detail, with interviews by Krassilnikov, Zaitsev, and others in the Russian language documentary series Spies and Traitors, Episode: Ampule With Poison, Russian Documentary TV Series, Accessed June 23, 2015 <>. The description of the actual events at the moment of the arrest is derived from close analysis of KGB archival footage of the arrest, which is includined in Ampule with Poison.



The Arrest of Stombaugh

The details of the Ames June 13, 1985 meeting between Ames and Cherkashin are from the Senate Select Committee, Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case. Also, Cherkashin/Feiffer, Spy Handler; Early, Confessions; Bearden/Risen, The Main Enemy, and Grimes/Vertefouille, Circle of Treason.


Stombaugh’s movements and experience of the arrest are from author interviews with Stombaugh.


The KGB’s perspective is from interviews with Vladimir Zaitsev and Rem Krassilnikov in Spies and Traitors: Ampule With Poison, Russian Documentary TV Series, Accessed June 23, 2015 <>; also Igor Atamanenko, The Most Cost-Effective CIA Agents, RU Special Forces, accessed March 2016 at <>.


The physical description of the arrest scene and the arrest is from KGB archival footage of the actual arrest which is included in Ampule with Poison.


Assessing the Damage

The description of the after-action analysis in Moscow is from personal experience confirmed through author interviews of Norville, Coyle, and Stombaugh. Stombaugh’s experience of his departure and arrival in the US, as well as his work on the Cowl case while at Heaquarters and his interaction with Ames over it, is from author interviews and correspondence with Stombaugh, who read the final version and confirmed it to be accurate.



The Gordievsky exfiltration is from Christopher Andrew with Oleg Gordievsky KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, Harper Collins, 1992 . Also Rachel Halliburton, TimeOut London Interview with Oleg Gordievsky, May 15, 2006, accessed March 2016<>, and Guy Walters, “Spy who came in from the cold …etc”, Daily Mail, 7 July, 2015. Accessed March 2016 at <




This chapter is primarily based on author interviews with Norville, Coyle, and Stombaugh but also relies on dates and timeline info from Grimes/Vertefouille, Circle of Treason, and Bearden/Risen, The Main Enemy.  The KGB perspective is from Krassilnikov, Ghosts of Tchaikovsky Street, and Krassilnikov interviews in the documentary Spies and Traitors: Тайник на проезде Серебрякова, accessed March 2016 <>. The documentary includes archival KGB surveillance of the stakeout and arrest of Poleshchuk, and this has been used in the description of the arrest. The Karavashkin quote about Ames contributing to the arrest is from V. V. Karavashkin, Who Betrayed Russia, Moscow: AST – 2008. – 672 <>



The description of how Stombaugh learned about Yurchenko and Howard is from author interviews with Stombaugh. The description of how we learned about it in Moscow is from personal experience and author interviews with Norville and Coyle. The cable is a reconstruction of what I recall was in the cable.



David Major

Author interviews with David Major and personal experience.



A Complicated Removal

Igor Atamanenko, KGB-CIA, Who is Stronger, Part 4, Chapter 1, “Mr. Million” which is available online: . Vladimir Zaitsev, Million, KGB Alpha Group. Accessed June 15, 2014 < activity/archive/214/3828>



Howard Escapes

Howard, Safe House, and author interview of Jack Platt Howard’s account that he deployed a ruse which resulted in an FBI officer being present, and FBI following him when he conducted his JIB escape, is disputed by all other accounts, all of which claim the FBI simply missed him when he departed home and did not have him under surveillance when he “escaped” using JIB scenario.


The Angry Colonel

The description of the scene in Moscow when we learned of the report from Headquarters is from personal experience. The confirmation that it was CKGENTILE who provided the information in the Headquarters cable is from Grimes/Vertefouille, Circle of Treason. The summary of the situation at CIA headquarters in October is derived from Grimes/Vertefouille, Circle of Treason and Bearden/Risen, The Main Enemy.


Andrianov and Howard

Source for the descriptions of the Andrianov-Howard interactions is the following: Komsomolskaya Pravda, “Interview of Victor Andrianov,” August 8, 2002 accessed in March 2015 at <>


As to Howard’s assertion that Mary was struck in the face during the interrogation — Jack Platt, head of the SE Internal Operations Course, was there for the exercise in question and flatly contradicts Howard’s assertion that Mary was hit. All of us went through the same exercise and although there was rough handling, no wife was ever hit in the face and in Mary’s case it is virtually certain this did not happen. Platt, in commenting on it, noted: “The strange thing was that when Howard and Mary both came out of the separate rooms where they were being interrogated, he didn’t even look at her or ask how she was. I thought that was very strange, as the common reaction of other officers was to immediately check that their spouse was okay. This was doubly strange because Mary was pregnant at the time.”


Lonetree and Hanssen

Ben A. Franklin, Marine Weeps as He Hears of KGB Seductions, New York Times, August 19, 1987, accessed March 2016 at; Victor Cherkashin, Spy Handler; Dancing with the Devil: Sex, Espionage, and the U.S. Marines: The Clayton Lonetree Story (Simon & Schuster, 336 pages,



Shadrin: Mystery Solved

Bearden/Risen, The Main Enemy, and Craig R. Whitney, Death of Soviet Defector and Spy is Tied to Kidnappying by Moscow, New York Times, November 2, 1993, accessed March 2015 <>



Author interview with David Major; personal experience. The description of Cherkashin’s battle with Androsov over the stick pins is from Cherkashin, Spy Handler. The description of Yurchenko’s redefection and Redmond realizing that Fitness had been compromised is from Bearden/Risen, The Main Enemy.



A Small Win

Personal experience and author interviews of Norville, Coyle, and Stombaugh.


A Tolkachev Successor

The “Back Room” operation is described in detail in Grimes/Vertefouille, Circle of Treason and Royden’s disinformation operations regarding fictitious KGB penetrations in Bangkok and Nairobi are described in detail in Bearden/Risen, The Main Enemy. The remainder of this chapter is from personal experience.and author interviews of Norville, Coyle, and Stombaugh.


Motorin and Vorontsov

The physical description of the arrest and removal of Motorin is from Igor Atamanenko, Отнюдь не простая охота на “кротов” Aug 28, 2008, Russian Special Forces <>

The description of the arrest of Cowl, Igor Atamenenko, Traitors, Army Without Banners, and Rem Krassilnikov, New Crusaders: The CIA and Restructuring, and Rem Krassilnikov, Ghosts of Tchaikovsky Street.


The Gavrilov Channel

Personal experience; Bearden/Risen, The Main Enemy, and Krassilnikov, Ghosts of Tchaikovsky Street.


March 10, 1986

Personal experience and Rem Krassilnikov, Ghosts of Tchaikovsky Street. Also KGB archival footage of my interrogation, accessed online in March 2014 at <> Also V. V. Karavashkin, Who Betrayed Russia, Moscow: AST – 2008. – 672 and Atamanenko, KGB-CIA: Who is Stronger?



Personal experience for the CIA side of it. For the KGB side, Krassilnikov, New Crusaders and Ghosts of Tchaikovsky Street and Atamanenko, KGB-CIA, Who is Stronger. Also the documentary Spies and Traitors: Code Name “Brilliant, accessed online in March 2016 <>


The Daniloff Affair

Nick Daniloff, Two Lives, One Russia, Houghton Mifflin 1988; author interview with David Major; Bearden/Risen, The Main Enemy; and George Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph, Scribner 1993.


End Game

Author interviews with David Major, Bill Norville, Gene Coyle, and Paul Stombaugh. Igor Atamenenko, KGB-CIA, Who is Stronger; Bill Gertz, “Expulsions’ Decapitate Soviet Spy Network,” The Washington Times, 23 October 1986; 1. John Goshko, “US Expelling 55 Soviet Diplomats as Clash Escalates,” The Washington Post, 23 October 1986; 1.